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Government by Blog Post 
Josh Blackman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Democrats lost their filibuster-proof majority in the Senate in the 
2010 midterm elections—due in large part to the rising unpopularity of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the growing strength of the Tea Party—
President Obama was largely unable to advance his agenda through the 
legislative process. Faced with Republican opposition at every step, Obama 
increasingly turned to executive power to take action where Congress 
would not. By 2011, the mantra of his presidency became “We can’t wait.” 
Charlie Savage reported that the President coined this slogan at a strategy 
meeting to “more aggressively use executive power to govern in the face of 
Congressional obstructionism.”1 When Congress will not legislate to the 
President’s satisfaction, he will act alone. In a White House blog post 
fittingly titled “We Can’t Wait” the administration listed all of the 
President’s executive actions, stressing that he “is not letting congressional 
gridlock slow our economic growth.”2 By my count, Obama has repeated 
this phrase at least a dozen times to justify taking executive action where 
Congress would not pass him the bill he wants.3
        *   Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston. This essay is adapted from 
Unraveled: Obamacare, Religious Liberty, & Executive Power (Cambridge University Press 2016). I 
would like to thank the members of the FIU Law Review and all of the participants of the symposium. 
1 Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 
2012), http://nyti.ms/1SgzZnC. 
2 We Can’t Wait, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 24, 2011), www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobs/we-
cant-wait.
3 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on the Economy and Housing (Oct. 
24, 2011, 2:15 PM) (“So I’m here to say to all of you––and to say to the people of Nevada and the 
people of Las Vegas––we can’t wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where 
they won’t act, I will. In recent weeks, we decided to stop waiting for Congress to fix No Child Left 
Behind, and decided to give states the flexibility they need to help our children meet higher standards.”) 
(emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/24/remarks-president-economy-and-
housing; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at a Campaign Event (Oct. 25, 
2011, 7:36 PM) (“And so we’re going to keep on putting pressure on them, but in the meantime we’re 
saying we can’t wait for Congress, and we’re going to go ahead and do everything we can through 
executive actions––whether it’s this refinancing program, or tomorrow I’m going to be talking about 
making college more affordable for young people––we’re not going to wait for Congress.”) (emphasis 
added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/25/remarks-president-campaign-event-1; Press 
Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at Signing of Executive Order (Oct. 31, 2011, 
12:50 PM) (“Congress has been trying since February to do something about this. It has not yet been 
able to get it done. And it is the belief of this administration, as well as folks like Bonnie and Jay, that 
we can’t wait for action on the Hill––we’ve got to go ahead and move forward.”) (emphasis added), 
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390 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:389 
If “We Can’t Wait” was President Obama’s mantra, the “Pen and 
Phone” was his method. In a cabinet meeting he explained, “We’re not just 
going to be waiting for legislation in order to make sure that we’re 
providing Americans the kind of help they need. I’ve got a pen and I’ve got 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/31/remarks-president-signing-executive-order; Press Re-
lease, The White House, Remarks by the President on Head Start in Yeadon, Pennsylvania (Nov. 8, 
2011, 11:43 AM) (“Our children deserve action. And we can’t wait for Congress any longer.”) 
(emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/08/remarks-president-head-start-yead
on-pennsylvania; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the House Democrats 
Issues Conference (Jan. 27, 2012, 1:36 PM) (“On the other hand, where they obstruct, where they’re 
unwilling to act, where they’re more interested in party than they are in country, more interested in the 
next election than the next generation, then we’ve got to call them out on it. We’ve got to call them out 
on it. We’ve got to push them. We can’t wait. We can’t be held back.”) (emphasis added), 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/27/remarks-president-house-democrats-issues-conference; 
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on No Child Left Behind Flexibility (Feb. 9, 
2012, 1:57 PM) (“In September, after waiting far too long for Congress to act, I announced that my 
administration would take steps to reform No Child Left Behind on our own. This was one of the first 
and the biggest “We Can’t Wait” announcements that we’ve made, because our kids and our schools 
can’t be held back by inaction.”) (emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/09/
remarks-president-no-child-left-behind-flexibility; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the 
President on the Economy—Warrensburg, Missouri (July 25, 2013, 5:09 PM) (“And I’m going to take 
these plans all across the country, and I’m going to ask folks for help because, frankly, sometimes I just 
can’t wait for Congress. It just takes them a long time to decide on stuff.”) (emphasis added),
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-president-economy-warrensburg-missouri; 
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on the Economy—Jacksonville, Florida 
(July 25, 2013, 2:45 PM) (“Unfortunately, over the past two years, too many folks in Washington have 
been cutting these investments. The world can’t wait for Congress to get its act together.”) (emphasis 
added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-president-economy-jacksonville-fl; Press 
Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on the National Network for Manufacturing 
Innovation (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:14 PM) (“Long term, the challenge of making sure everybody who works 
hard can get ahead in today’s economy is so important that we can’t wait for Congress to solve it. Where 
I can act on my own without Congress, I’m going to do so.”) (emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/01/15/remarks-president-national-network-manufacturing-innovation; Press Release, 
The White House, Remarks by the President on Opportunity for All and Skills for America’s Workers 
(Jan. 30, 2014, 11:27 AM) (“Some of the ideas I presented I’m going to need Congress for. But America 
cannot stand still, and neither will I. So wherever I can take steps to expand opportunity, to help working 
families, that’s what I’m going to do with or without Congress. I want to work with them, but I can’t 
wait for them. We’ve got too much work to do out there.”) (emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/01/30/remarks-president-opportunity-all-and-skills-americas-workers; Press Release, 
The White House, Remarks by the President on Jobs in American Infrastructure (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:40 
PM) (“But what I also said at the State of the Union is, in this year of action, whenever I can partner 
directly with states or cities or business leaders or civic leaders to act on this opportunity agenda, I’m 
going to go ahead and do it. We can’t wait. We’ve got to move. We’ve got to get things going. Too 
many families are counting on it.”) (emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/
26/remarks-president-jobs-american-infrastructure; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the 
President Before Cabinet Meeting (July 1, 2014, 11:04 AM) (“And part of the reason that I wanted to 
bring the Cabinet together today is to underscore for them my belief I think shared by most Americans 
that we can’t wait for Congress to actually get going on issues that are vital to the middle class.”) 
(emphasis added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/01/remarks-president-cabinet-meeting; 
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on the Economy (July 1, 2014, 2:22 PM) 
(“Middle-class families can’t wait for Republicans in Congress to do stuff. So sue me.”) (emphasis 
added), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/01/remarks-president-economy.
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2016] Government by Blog Post 391 
a phone.”4 Specifically, he said, “I can use that pen to sign executive orders 
and take executive actions and administrative actions that move the ball 
forward”5 to “advance a mission that . . . unifies all Americans.”6 To 
accomplish this mission, the President insisted that his cabinet “use all the 
tools available to us, not just legislation.”7 The President’s Chief of Staff, 
John Podesta, put it bluntly: “The upshot: Congressional gridlock does not 
mean the federal government stands still.”8
The Obama approach to governance was crystalized in a November 
2014 Saturday Night Live parody of the Schoolhouse Rock! classic, titled 
“How a Bill Does Not Become a Law.”9 A character dressed as a Bill, 
standing on the steps of Capitol Hill, was explaining to a boy how he would 
become a law. “Well first I go to the House, and they vote on me. But then I 
need from the Senate a majority. And if I pass the legislative test, then I 
wind up on the President’s desk.”10 President Obama appears, and shoves 
the Bill down the steps. The boy shouts, “President Obama, what’s the big 
idea. That bill was trying to become a law.”11 The smirking President tells 
the boy, “There’s actually an even easier way to get things done around 
here. It’s called an executive order.”12 Another character, dressed as an 
Executive Order appears. “I’m an executive order,” he sings, “and I pretty 
must just happen.”13 The boy asks, “Don’t you have to go through Congress 
at some point?”14 The Executive Order, with cigarette in hand, dismisses the 
boy. “Oh that’s adorable, you still think that’s how government works.”15
The bill climbs back up the stairs and sings, “Look at the midterm elections, 
people clearly don’t want this”16 executive order. The Bill, gasping, climbs 
up the steps and sings, “We’re going to take you to court, we’re going to 
shut down all the Congress––”17 Obama shoves the Bill down the stairs one 
4 Obama on Executive Actions: “I’ve Got a Pen and I’ve Got a Phone”, CBS DC (Jan. 14, 2014, 
1:05 PM), http://cbsloc.al/1YhuYzX (emphasis added).
5 Rebecca Kaplan, Obama: I Will Use My Pen and Phone to Take on Congress, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
14, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://cbsn.ws/1PWUdS3. 
6 Obama on Executive Actions: “I’ve Got a Pen and I’ve Got a Phone”, CBS DC (Jan. 14, 2014, 
1:05 PM), http://cbsloc.al/1YhuYzX.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Saturday Night Live: How a Bill Does Not Become a Law (NBC television broadcast Nov. 22, 
2014), www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/capitol-hill-cold-open/2830152.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 55 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
07 - BLACKMAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
392 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:389 
last time. 
During the implementation of the Affordable Care Act,18 President 
Obama repeatedly turned to this all-too-familiar pattern of executive action.
(Note that executive action, an umbrella term that includes memoranda and 
other informal guidance documents from administrative agencies, is far 
broader than actual executive orders signed by the President.19) First, the 
impact of the Affordable Care Act made certain groups worse off. Second, 
as a result, Congress was pressured to modify the law to alleviate these 
negative externalities from the law. However, Democrats feared that 
Republicans would seize the opportunity to unravel other portions of the 
law. This halted any possible bipartisan support for legislative amendments. 
Third, in the face of this gridlock, President Obama turned to executive 
action to alter the ACA’s onerous mandates. Specifically, he delayed and 
suspended the individual and employer mandates, as well as modified 
provisions affecting benefits for Congressional employees and coverage in 
the U.S. territories. 
Each of these executive actions—implemented through formal notice-
and-comment rulemaking or informal social-media blogging—came as a 
complete surprise. Each change posed risks to the long-term sustainability 
of the law. Each change relied on tenuous readings of the statute, and 
dubious assertions of executive authority to accomplish ends entirely at 
odds with what Congress designed. Each action was contested in court by 
states and private parties. However, because the executive actions had the 
effect of lifting burdens, rather than imposing any injuries, the government 
vigorously contested that no one had standing to bring suit. As a result, the 
ultimate legality of these moves was decided not by the courts, but by the 
President, who desperately acted alone to salvage his signature law. 
One of the more disconcerting aspects of the law’s implementation, 
beyond the numerous delays and waivers, has been the cavalier approach by 
which the government announced these changes. More often than not, the 
explanation of a modification would come in a social media update on the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) blog (often on a Friday 
afternoon). For example, as Ezra Klein and Sarah Kliff observed, “on the 
Friday following the Fourth of July, [the administration] quietly released a 
606-page regulation that delayed requirements for the marketplaces to 
18 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
19 Gregory Korte, Obama Issues “Executive Orders by Another Name”, USA TODAY (Dec. 17, 
2014, 1:16 PM), http://goo.gl/gBS7QC (President Obama had “already signed 33% more presidential 
memoranda in less than six years than Bush did in eight. He’s also issued 45% more than the last 
Democratic president, Bill Clinton, who assertively used memoranda to signal what kinds of regulations 
he wanted federal agencies to adopt. Obama is not the first president to use memoranda to accomplish 
policy aims. But at this point in his presidency, he’s the first to use them more often than executive 
orders.”).
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verify workers’ incomes and employment status.”20 One benefits lawyer 
lamented that this process “is how HHS often breaks controversial 
regulatory news.”21 It soon became a painful pastime of ferreting through 
these massive document dumps and attempting to find the actual basis for 
the rule previously announced in the blog post. And invariably, the policy, 
as stated in the blog post, doesn’t quite match up what is in the rule. This 
was no longer a government of law, but a government by blog post.22
II. “BUSINESSES CAME TO US”
Although the Affordable Care Act’s exchanges launched on October 1, 
2013, the crucial date was actually January 1, 2014. On this day, there 
would be three major milestones. First, the individual mandate would kick 
in, penalizing people who were uninsured or who had an insurance policy 
that did not meet the requirements of “minimum essential coverage.”23
Second, for the new year, the ACA’s employer mandate required businesses 
with more than fifty employees to provide their full-time workers with a 
qualified health insurance plan or alternatively pay a penalty.24 This 
mandate included the requirement for employers to provide their workers 
with cost-free access to contraceptives. Third, policies purchased on the 
ACA exchanges—subsidized by federal tax credits—would begin. 
Congress directed that these three interlocking mechanisms would 
simultaneously go into effect on January 1, 2014, so that all Americans 
would benefit from health care reform at once. Or at least that was the plan. 
After millions of canceled plans, difficulties of signing up online, and 
opposition from the business community, President Obama would alter 
each of these mandates in ways Congress never intended. 
The first crack in the ACA’s armor formed in July 2013, months 
before HealthCare.gov launched. Since its inception, businesses lobbied the 
White House to delay or modify the employer mandate, in order to avoid 
the added cost of covering their employees.25 Specifically, businesses 
warned that they would drop employees from full-time to part-time—less 
than thirty-hours per week—in order to avoid the ACA penalty. Neil 
20 Ezra Klein & Sarah Kliff, Obama’s Last Campaign: Inside the White House Plan to Sell 
Obamacare, WASH. POST (July 17, 2013), http://wapo.st/1oGgo92. 
21 R. Pepper Crutcher, Jr., Union Funds May Find Treasure Buried in HHS Rule Preamble,
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT REV. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.acareview.com/2013/10/union-funds-may-
find-treasure-buried-in-hhs-rule-preamble.
22 Josh Blackman, Obamacare and Government by Blog Post, LIBERTY LAW SITE (Mar. 10, 
2014), https://perma.cc/KP28-FEJR. 
23 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
24 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(c) (2012). 
25 Robb Mandelbaum, The Employer Mandate Has Been Delayed. Will It Be Rewritten?, N.Y.
TIMES Blog (July 3, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://goo.gl/qEOZF7. 
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Trautwein, the Vice President of the National Retail Federation explained 
that if the mandate went into effect, employers would start cutting hours: “If 
you set a hard 30-hour limit for eligibility, you encourage employers to cut 
where they can. You’re not going to cut willy-nilly, but potentially you 
increase your part-time workforce.”26
Their rent-seeking worked. President Obama would later explain that 
“businesses came to us and said, ‘listen, we were supportive of providing 
health insurance to employees, in fact, we provide health insurance to our 
employees; we understand you want to get at the bad actors here, but are 
there ways to provide us some administrative relief?’”27 And he did just 
that. On July 2, Mark Manzur, the assistant secretary for tax policy, took to 
social media to update the ACA’s status. 
In a blog post titled Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, 
Thoughtful Manner, the Obama administration nonchalantly suspended the 
employer mandate.28 The ACA provides that the employer mandate “shall 
apply to months beginning after December 31, 2013.” That is, it goes into 
effect on January 1, 2014. However, Manzur blogged that the government 
“will provide an additional year before the ACA mandatory employer and 
insurer reporting requirements begin.”29
To justify this “transitional” policy, the blog post cited the “complexity 
of the requirements and the need for more time to implement them 
effectively.”30 Although Manzur’s announcement was framed in terms of 
relaxing the ACA’s onerous reporting demands—over which the HHS 
secretary does have significant discretion—the true impact of this delay was 
to prevent the government from being able to impose penalties on non-
compliant employers. The post mentions, almost as a side note, that “[w]e 
recognize that this transition relief will make it impractical to determine 
which employers owe shared responsibility payments . . . . Accordingly, we 
are extending this transition relief to [them].”31 In other words, because 
employers were not obligated to report to the government how many 
uninsured workers they had, the government had no method of assessing 
the employer mandate’s penalty. With the click of a mouse—without so 
much as a tweet of advance notice to affected parties—the government 
announced that the employer mandate was suspended for all employers in 
2014.
26 Sarah Kliff, The Politics of Delaying Obamacare, WASH. POST (July 2, 2013), https://perma.
cc/CRU6-7HGT.
27 Interview with President Obama, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2013), http://goo.gl/K4qZJ7. 
28 Mark Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, TREAS.
NOTES (July 2, 2013), https://goo.gl/vd0GvQ. 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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Shortly after the blog post went viral, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) released a notice regarding “transition relief,” announcing that the 
employer mandate’s penalty will not be “assessed for 2014.”32 Mark Iwry, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary at Treasury, defended the delay by explaining 
that the agency has done this a dozen times before, without any 
Congressional objection: “On a number of prior occasions across 
administrations, this authority has been used to postpone the application of 
new legislation when the immediate application would have subjected 
taxpayers to unreasonable administrative burdens or costs.”33
Observers saw different motivations for the change, beyond 
administrative convenience. Sarah Kliff noted that beyond the “complexity 
of the [reporting] requirements,” some “observers saw a political 
motivation as well.”34 Michigan Law Professor Nicholas Bagley was 
skeptical about the purported reason for the delay: “Affording transitional 
relief for a law that was enacted four years ago raised the question of, 
shouldn’t you have had your ducks in a row when you knew this was 
coming down the pike?”35 The business community, which stood to benefit 
from this largesse, was pleased. “I think this is less about readiness and 
more about the fact that they’re trying to be flexible in their 
implementation,” said Rhett Buttle, vice president of the Small Business 
Majority.36 “It does seem like an olive branch” to the business community, 
he said.37 The businesses can’t wait, but their employees would have to. 
III. “LET’S MAKE A TECHNICAL CHANGE OF THE LAW”
The decision to delay the employer mandate came as a surprise to 
virtually everyone outside of the White House. The Washington Post
reported that thirty minutes before the Treasury Department updated its 
status, the administration poked the Democratic leadership in the Senate 
and House.38 They did not like it. This last-minute notice was deemed a 
slight, because only a week earlier on June 24, Jeanne Lambrew gave them 
no indication that the mandate would be delayed. The Post, quoting an 
anonymous White House official, attributed the secrecy to GOP opposition 
32 I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116, at 3 (July 9, 2013), http://goo.gl/71ZfJI. 
33 Sarah Kliff, The White House Keeps Changing Obamacare. Is That Legal?, WASH. POST
(Aug. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/9BHZ-XJWE.
34 Sarah Kliff, The Politics of Delaying Obamacare, WASH. POST (July 2, 2013), https://perma.
cc/CRU6-7HGT.
35 Sarah Kliff, The White House Keeps Changing Obamacare. Is That Legal?, WASH. POST
(Aug. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/9BHZ-XJWE.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, HealthCare.gov: How Political Fear Was Pitted Against 
Technical Needs, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/E5FT-JARS. 
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to Obamacare: “It’s very hard for a staffer to talk to a member of Congress 
about a decision that’s not made yet.”39 This delay was also the first major 
hint that something was awry with the ACA. Sarah Kliff wrote on 
WonkBlog that the delay of the employer mandate, along with the earlier 
delay of the launch of the small business insurance marketplaces, “could 
draw criticism that the administration will not be able to put into effect its 
signature legislative accomplishment on schedule.”40
Reportedly, the White House even kept the Treasury Department out 
of the loop until the very end. A March 2014 letter by House Oversight 
Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) charged that “the White House 
Chief of Staff knew about the employer mandate delay prior to the head of 
the [Treasury] department implementing the program.”41 Issa noted this 
approach raised “serious questions about whether the White House directed 
the delay of the employer mandate for political reasons.”42 The Californian 
explained that Mark Mazur could not recall if any lawyers within the 
Treasury discussed if they had the legal authority to delay the mandate. 
The President attempted to justify the delay by faulting the 
Republicans, whom he deemed unwilling to make a minor change to the 
law. “In a normal political environment,” Obama explained, “it would have 
been easier for me to simply call up the speaker and say . . . let’s make a 
technical change of the law.”43 In a different time, the President suggested, 
“[t]hat would be the normal thing that I would prefer to do.” For example, 
in 1936, President Roosevelt’s implementation of Social Security had to be 
delayed because the government couldn’t figure out how to create twenty-
six million unique numbers for workers.44 President Lyndon B. Johnson 
signed Medicare into law on July 30, 1965, and it was scheduled to go into 
effect on July 1, 1966—a day the New York Times dubbed “M-Day.”45 The 
enrollment effort successfully enrolled 93% of eligible seniors by 1966, in 
some cases forest rangers tracked down hermits in the woods.46 But that 
wasn’t enough—President Johnson was able to persuade Congress to delay 
39 Id.
40 Sarah Kliff, White House Delays Employer Mandate Requirement Until 2015, WASH. POST
(July 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/3BVW-47QG. 
41 Jonathan Easley, Issa Questions Treasury’s Authority to Delay ObamaCare Employer 
Mandate, THE HILL (Mar. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/2EXC-3S4B. 
42 Id.
43 George Will, Obama’s Unconstitutional Steps Worse than Nixon’s, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 
2013), https://goo.gl/2CGOXi. 
44 STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND THE 
FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 314 (2015).
45 Sarah Kliff, When Medicare Launched, Nobody Had Any Clue Whether It Would Work,
WASH. POST (May 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/AW6A-6QW6.
46 Id.
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the rollout by two months in order to get more people to enroll.47 In 2013, 
however, President Obama said we were “not in a normal atmosphere 
around here when it comes to, quote-unquote, ‘Obamacare.’”48 But this was 
not accurate—there in fact was bipartisan support to delay the employer 
mandate. 
On July 17, two weeks after the Treasury Department shared its new 
posting, the House of Representatives passed the Authority for Mandate 
Delay Act.49 The two-page bill would have delayed the implementation of 
the employer mandate until 2015.50 That is precisely what the blog post 
accomplished, except it had the backing of the legislative branch. It was 
enacted on a 264-161 vote, with thirty-five Democrats voting yea. 
In response to this bill, which would have unequivocally given him the 
authority to delay the mandate, the President issued a veto threat. The 
White House said the bill was “unnecessary.”51 Underlying this veto threat 
was a concern that Republicans could later add amendments to the bill, 
which would unravel other provisions of the law. Because of the President’s 
executive action, the Democratic-controlled Senate—spared the need to 
take a tough vote—never even considered the bill. 
With the employer mandate already delayed until January 2015, 
lobbying was enhanced to push it back even further. Harvard Professor 
John McDonough, who advised Senator Ted Kennedy, explained that the 
delay is “not a freebie.”52 “Politically, it won’t get easier a year from now 
[to implement], it will get harder,” he said.53 “You’ve given the employer 
community a sense of confidence that maybe they can kill this. If I were an 
employer, I would smell blood in the water.”54
Once again, the rent-seeking worked. Seven months after the initial 
blog post, the Treasury Department postponed the full implementation of 
the employer mandate until 2016.55 But in doing so, the executive branch 
47 BRILL, supra note 44, at 315.
48 Wash. Post Staff, TRANSCRIPT: President Obama’s August 9, 2013, News Conference at the 
White House, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/9BRB-RS5E. 
49 Authority for Mandate Delay Act, H.R. 2667, 113th Cong. (2013); Final Vote Results for Roll 
Call 361, GOVTRACK (July 17, 2013), www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/113-2013/h361# (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016). 
50 To delay the application of the employer health insurance mandate, and for other purposes. 
Authority for Mandate Delay Act, H.R. 2667, 113th Cong. (2013). 
51 Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (July 16, 2013), https://
perma.cc/7YZL-T4BA.
52 Sarah Kliff, The Politics of Delaying Obamacare, WASH. POST (July 2, 2013), https://perma.
cc/CRU6-7HGT.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8574 
(Feb. 12, 2014). 
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did not merely delay the requirement. Instead, it modified the mandate in a 
fragmented manner, with novel standards that deviated from Congress’s 
design. First, for businesses with 50 to 100 full-time employees, the 
employer mandate penalty would not be assessed at all during 2015. For 
these companies, the employer mandate would be entirely delayed for two 
full years. According to the Small Business Administration, there are 
roughly eight million people (7% of all workers in America) at companies 
in this range.56 Second, the mandate would only be partially implemented 
for businesses with more than 100 employees. In 2015, these businesses 
would not be subjected to the penalty if they offered health insurance 
coverage for at least 70% of their employees. Starting in 2016, an employer 
that offered coverage to 95% of its employees would not be subject to the 
penalty. 
Absolutely none of this—not the bifurcation of employers, not the 
70% transitional mandate, not the 95% final threshold—is in the ACA. The 
President suspended the employer mandate for 2014, partially waived it for 
2015, and decided that in 2016 and beyond the mandate will never be fully 
implemented as Congress designed. The delay of the employer mandate 
would form the basis of a 2014 lawsuit brought by the United States House 
of Representatives.57
IV. “CONGRESS SHOULD LIVE UNDER THE SAME LAWS IT PASSES”
Influential corporations would not be the only beneficiaries of 
executive-action largess. In September 2009, while the ACA was being 
drafted, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) proposed an amendment requiring 
members of Congress and their staff to use the newly-created exchanges. 
“The more that Congress experiences the laws we pass,” Grassley said, “the 
better the laws are likely to be.”58 The veteran fiscal hawk added, “My 
interest in having Members of Congress participate in the exchange is 
consistent with my long-held view that Congress should live under the same 
laws it passes for the rest of the country.”59 The amendment provided that 
the federal government could only offer members of Congress and their 
congressional staff health insurance plans that were “created under” the 
ACA or “through an Exchange established under” the new law.60
56 Sarah Kliff, The White House Is Relaxing the Employer Mandate Again, WASH. POST (Feb. 
10, 2014), https://perma.cc/LV2C-87FH. 
57 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015).
58 Grassley Amendment Makes Congress Obtain Coverage from Health Care Plan Established 
in Reform Bill, GRASSLEY.SENATE.GOV (Sept. 30, 2009), https://perma.cc/P55Z-EHD5. 
59 Id.
60 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(D)(i) (2012). 
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As a result of the amendment, unlike all other federal civil servants, 
Hill staffers would no longer be eligible for the generous Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP). Under FEHBP, the government 
pays approximately 75% of an employee’s annual premium. This annual 
tax-free contribution of between $5,000 and $12,000 was far more generous 
than the income-adjusted subsidies available on HealthCare.gov. Indeed, 
many well-compensated congressional employees would be ineligible for 
any subsidies on the exchange. These high-earning civil servants would be 
put in the same position as other Americans who had to pay for their own 
insurance.
In 2009, while the Senate was crafting its health care reform bill, the 
House of Representatives was working on a parallel track. In contrast with 
the Grassley amendment, the House bill would have allowed members and 
their staff to remain on FEHBP, with the full 75% government-sponsored 
contribution. This provision, which would have maintained the status quo, 
would not make it into the final law. Due to the election of Senator Scott 
Brown in January 2010 and the urgent need to enact the Senate bill, the 
House was forced to accept Grassley’s amendment without any debate. 
Representative Diana DeGette (D-CO), who voted for the ACA, explained, 
“We had to take the Senate version of the health care bill. This is not 
anything we spent time talking about here in the House.”61 Another House 
Democrat told the New York Times, “This was a stupid provision that never 
should have gotten into the law.”62 But it did. 
Unsurprisingly, this provision was extremely unpopular on Capitol 
Hill. In May 2013, Senator Reid acknowledged that there was a “conflict” 
over how the ACA treats congressional staff.63 The Senate Majority Leader 
said “we’re trying to work that out” with House Speaker John Boehner.64
Politico reported that during the summer of 2013, Boehner and Reid quietly 
collaborated to develop a “legislative fix” that would ensure that federal 
employees would not be disrupted.65 The duo even personally lobbied 
President Obama at the White House, while using a cover story so as not to 
arouse suspicions.66
However, as the movement to repeal and replace Obamacare grew 
during July and August, the House GOP leadership abandoned any efforts 
61 Robert Pear, Wrinkle in Health Law Vexes Lawmakers’ Aides, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), 
http://nyti.ms/1PX5PEG. 
62 Id.
63 Alexander Bolton, Reid: More Funding Needed to Prevent ObamaCare from Becoming Train 
Wreck”, THE HILL (May 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/LW3Y-5LWY.
64 Id.
65 John Bresnahan, Boehner’s Fight for Hill Subsidies, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2013, 2:08 PM), http://
politi.co/23mlaYN. 
66 Id.
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to modify the ACA, short of total repeal. By September, a spokesman for 
Boehner explained, “We always made it clear that the House would not 
pass any legislative ‘fix.’”67 Republicans now viewed this as a wedge issue 
that could force Democrats to negotiate over the ACA, lest their staff lose 
their truly-affordable care. The spokesman said that the Speaker “was 
always clear, however, that any ‘fix’ would be a Democratic ‘fix.’ His ‘fix’ 
is repealing Obamacare.”68
Responding to this gridlock, Politico wrote that President Obama 
became “personally involved in [the] dispute.” Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) 
relayed, “The president is aware of it. His people are working on it.”69 But 
once again, there was distinct risk that making modifications to the statute 
could open the door for Republican amendments that would impact other 
aspects of the law. Like with the employer mandate, the President was not 
willing to take that chance. A more attractive option, as noted by Senator 
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), was for the President to act unilaterally. She 
explained that Democrats were “looking at what we can do with it 
administratively.”70 Obama would do just that, and once again turn to the 
executive action to resolve a legislative impasse. 
September 30 was the eve of the government shutdown. As the 
barricades on national parks were going up and HealthCare.gov was about 
to go down, the White House deployed a two-fold strategy. First, the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) announced that members of Congress 
and their staff would be able to purchase health insurance on the District of 
Columbia’s Small Business Health Options Programs, know as the D.C. 
SHOP exchange.71 The ACA authorized these new SHOP exchanges to 
offer a health insurance marketplace for workers at small businesses with 
fewer than 50 employees.72 OPM determined that after a congressional 
employee enrolled on the D.C. SHOP Exchange, the government could then 
provide the same contribution that was offered under the FEHBP.73 Thus, 
there would be no meaningful disruption in benefits for Capitol Hill 
staffers. However, there is a problem with this approach. The House of 
Representatives and the Senate employ over 21,000 people—they were not 
in any sense small businesses.74 Further, no other employees on the SHOP 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 John Bresnahan, Obama on Hill’s ACA Mess: I’m on It, POLITICO (July 31, 2013), https://
perma.cc/L3U8-ZRYT.
70 Id.
71 See 78 Fed. Reg. 60,653, 60,653–54 (Oct. 2, 2013). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 18024(b)(2) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 155.710(b) (2015). 
73 5 C.F.R. § 890.501(h) (2015). 
74 NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS CH. 5: CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF AND OPERATING EXPENSES, BROOKINGS INST. ET AL. (July 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/ZTX2-
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exchange would receive such a generous tax-free benefit. 
Second, to address this deficiency, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) posted on its blog a new frequently asked 
question (FAQ)75: “How will Members of Congress and Congressional staff 
access health insurance coverage through an Exchange,” the agency 
rhetorically asked.76 The answer: “CMS clarifies that offices of the 
Members of Congress, as qualified employers, are eligible to participate in 
a SHOP regardless of the size.”77
A sole FAQ by itself cannot be the source of legal authority. In a 
different case, a federal court ruled that the CMS could not rely on an FAQ 
on their blog (FAQ 33) as the basis to support its modification of the 
method used for calculating hospital-specific supplemental Medicaid 
payment limits.78 The court found that because FAQ 33 was the “sole 
authority” for the government’s decision, it must be set aside as unlawful.79
Because of the SHOP FAQ, each congressional office was treated as a 
separate employer. Rather than viewing the entire Congressional workforce 
as a small business—which it was certainly not—CMS and OPM chopped 
up the Capitol into hundreds of distinct offices, each deemed its own small 
business—which they certainly were not. And even if an office had more 
than fifty employees, “regardless of the size,” it would still be treated as a 
small business. To paraphrase Justice Scalia’s dissent in King v. Burwell,
“[w]ords no longer have meaning” if Congress is a bunch of small 
businesses.80
Further, once employees were enrolled on the D.C. SHOP exchange, 
under the OPM rule, they would be eligible for the full 75% government-
provided contribution. Notwithstanding the Grassley Amendment, which 
expressly sought to put congressional employees on the same footing as 
Americans on the exchanges, now congressional employees would be in the 
exact same position as they were before the enactment of the ACA.
Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) would challenge the legality of OPM 
regulation in 2014. The court dismissed the case because the Senator—who 
actually benefited from the more generous benefits—was not injured, and 
thus lacked standing. However, Judge William C. Griesbach was troubled 
HZTA.
75 Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, Members of Congress and Staff Accessing Coverage Through Health Insurance Exchanges 
(Marketplaces) (Sept. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/2RY5-JY5S. 
76 Id.
77 Id. (emphasis added).
78 Texas Children’s Hosp. v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 224, 238 (D.D.C. 2014).
79 Id.
80 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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by what he saw as executive overreach.81 Taking the allegations “as true,”82
he wrote, the “executive branch has rewritten a key provision of the ACA 
so as to render it essentially meaningless in order to save members of 
Congress and their staffs from the consequences of a controversial law that 
will affect millions of citizens.”83 Allowing the President to rewrite the law, 
and not enforce other requirements “would be a violation of Article I of the 
Constitution, which reposes the lawmaking power in the legislative 
branch.”84 Although the scope of the change is minor, Griesbach concluded, 
“the violation alleged is not a mere technicality.”85 The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case on standing grounds, 
but did not address the underlying constitutional issue.86
V. “THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HONOR THE COMMITMENT” HE MADE
In October 2013, as Healthcare.gov sputtered along, a bipartisan 
consensus formed that the millions of people whose policies were canceled 
deserved relief. Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) introduced the Keeping the 
Affordable Care Act Promise Act.87 The bill—whose title was a direct 
rebuke to the President’s broken promise88—would have grandfathered all 
active plans that were valid on December 31, 2013. Landrieu explained on 
the Senate floor, “When we passed the Affordable Care Act, we did so with 
the intention that if you liked your health plan, you could keep it. . . . A 
promise was made and this legislation will ensure that this promise is 
kept.”89 Under her proposal, the individual mandate—which required that 
millions of American purchase new, more comprehensive plans—would be 
temporarily suspended. The bill was supported by moderate Democrat Joe 
Manchin of West Virginia and Republicans Susan Collins from Maine and 
Lisa Murkowski of Alaska.90
Senator Landrieu’s bill posed two risks for the Obama administration. 
First, delaying the mandate could undermine the stability of the health care 
81 Johnson v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 1:14-CV-009 (E.D. Wis. 2014), http://goo.gl/L7N5I8. 
82 Id. at 18.
83 Id. at 18–19.
84 Id. at 19. 
85 Id.
86 Johnson v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 783 F.3d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 2015). 
87 Keeping the Affordable Care Act Promise Act, S. 1642, 113th Cong. (2013). 
88 Louis Jacobson, Barack Obama Says That What He’d Said Was You Could Keep Your Plan 
“If It Hasn’t Changed Since the Law Passed”, POLITIFACT (Nov. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/8WDK-
RUBE.
89 Ezra Klein, Obamacare Is in Much More Trouble than It Was One Week Ago, WASH. POST
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qxmeLC. 
90 Jackie Calmes & Jonathan Weisman, Despite Fumbles, Obama Defends Health Care Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1TEJtP3. 
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exchanges. If healthy people—no longer subject to the mandate’s penalty—
failed to purchase comprehensive health insurance, the exchanges would be 
skewed by older, sicker patients, driving costs up. The American Academy 
of Actuaries warned that “delaying the implementation of the ACA’s 
individual mandate or extending the enrollment period for obtaining 
coverage could have negative consequences for health insurance coverage 
and costs.”91 This could result in the dreaded adverse selection death spiral 
that the drafters of the ACA sought to avoid.92
The New York Times reported that Landrieu’s “legislation and a similar 
bill written by a Republican House member set off alarms among [White 
House] policy aides, who feared that letting consumers keep old plans could 
further undermine the health care law.”93 In July, the House of 
Representatives passed the Fairness for American Families Act, which 
would have delayed the individual mandate for a year.94 President Obama 
threatened to veto it, claiming it “would raise health insurance premiums 
and increase the number of uninsured Americans.”95 Representative Chris 
Van Hollen (D-MD) added that if there was a delay of the individual 
mandate, “premiums would jump much higher,” which “would sabotage the 
entire purpose of the exchange.”96
Second, amending the law to delay the individual mandate created the 
risk that Republicans could attach amendments that would repeal other 
aspects of the law. Ezra Klein observed that “[o]nce Congress reopens 
Obamacare, no one knows where they stop. Landrieu’s bill, for instance, 
will also have to pass the House—and they’re going to want to attach 
provisions to it that Democrats won’t much like.”97 Similar fears prevented 
the Democratic leadership from supporting legislative fixes for the the 
employer mandate and for congressional employees’ health care. 
As a result, pressure mounted on the President, once again, to take 
executive action to deal with the canceled plans. During Kathleen 
Sebelius’s appearance on The Daily Show, host Jon Stewart pointed out that 
businesses already received an administrative reprieve from the employer 
91 Jonathan Easely, Actuaries: ACA Delays Would Cause Chaos, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:31 
PM), http://bit.ly/1qwKKMJ. 
92 See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2614 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).
93 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Michael D. Shear, Inside the Race to Rescue a Health Care Site, and 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1MERH2E. 
94 Fairness for American Families Act, H.R. 2668, 113th Cong. (2013). 
95 Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (July 16, 2013), https://
perma.cc/7YZL-T4BA.
96 Ezra Klein, What Republicans Don’t Understand About the Politics of Obamacare, WASH.
POST (Sept. 24, 2013), http://wapo.st/1S0lrM7. 
97 Ezra Klein, Obamacare Is in Much More Trouble than It Was One Week Ago, WASH. POST
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qxmeLC. 
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mandate, but individuals with canceled policies were out of luck. “But 
would you say that’s a legitimate criticism that an individual doesn’t get to 
delay it, but a business does? Is that not legitimate?”98 Sebelius could only 
muster a reply that individuals are not actually required to buy insurance. 
But if they go uninsured, she added, “[t]hey pay a fine at the end of the year 
. . . .”99 (A year after the Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate as a 
tax, and Sebelius still referred to it as a fine.)
Even the 42nd President joined the fray, urging the 44th President to 
take action. President Clinton said that people should be allowed to keep 
their policies: “I personally believe, even if it takes a change in the law, that 
the president should honor the commitment the federal government made to 
those people and let them keep what they’ve got.”100 Obama had once 
called Clinton the “Secretary of Explaining Things,” and the former 
President understood the risk of canceled policies all too well.101 It was 
Harry and Louise’s fear—from the famous advertising campaign—that they 
would have to change their coverage that doomed HillaryCare in 1994.102
House Speaker John Boehner relished in Clinton’s critique: “These 
comments signify a growing recognition that Americans were misled when 
they were promised that they could keep their coverage under President 
Obama’s health care law. The entire health care law is a train wreck that 
needs to go.”103
Hillary Clinton said nothing about the canceled policies.104 In contrast 
with her husband’s loquaciousness, the former Secretary of State’s silence 
was deafening. On the campaign trail six years earlier, candidate Clinton’s 
health care plan featured an individual mandate, which would have also 
resulted in the cancellation of inadequate plans. To assuage the fears that 
derailed her healthcare reform two decades earlier, during a 2007 event in 
Iowa, Clinton made an all-too-familiar promise: “You can keep the doctors 
you know and trust. You keep the insurance you have. If you have private 
98  Lucy McCalmont, Sebelius Gets the Stewart Treatment, POLITICO (Oct. 8, 2013), http://politi.
co/23mraRn.
99 Id.
100 Jonathan Easley, Clinton: Let People Keep Coverage, THE HILL (Nov. 12, 2013 10:06 AM), 
http://bit.ly/1ULC4i4.
101 Jonathan Cohn, Bill Clinton Is Wrong. This Is How Obamacare Works, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 
12, 2013), https://perma.cc/BTZ3-VT3U. 
102 PAUL RUTHERFORD, ENDLESS PROPAGANDA: THE ADVERTISING OF PUBLIC GOODS 247 
(2000); clintonlibrary42, “Harry and Louise” Health Care Ads (Clinton Administration), YOUTUBE
(Aug. 26, 2014), bit.ly/1S7JCL6. 
103 Juliet Eilperin, Bill Clinton Identifies 3 Big Problems with the Obamacare Rollout, WASH.
POST (Nov. 12, 2013, 2:56 PM), https://perma.cc/JMD6-7SC4.
104 Josh Gerstein, Obama’s Critic-in-Chief Strikes Again, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
politi.co/1TEKZkf.
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insurance you like, nothing changes—you can keep that insurance.”105
Ironically, during the 2008 campaign, candidate Obama attacked the 
individual mandate. He likened Clinton’s plan to “solv[ing] homelessness 
by mandating that everyone buy a house.”106 However, once Obama 
secured the nomination, he copied Clinton’s plan almost in its entirety—
including the individual mandate. Neera Tanden, who had been Clinton’s 
adviser joined Obama’s policy staff. She recalled that when she asked the 
first term Senator what he thought of a mandate, Obama replied, “I kind of 
think Hillary was right.”107 In the race for the White House in 2016, Clinton 
embraced the Affordable Care Act as her own. During a February 2016 
debate in Milwaukee, Clinton boasted that “You know, before it was called 
Obamacare, it was called Hillarycare.”108
VI. “SABOTAGE THE HEALTH CARE LAW”
On November 5, President Obama and Vice President Biden met with 
sixteen Democratic Senators at the White House to discuss the dueling 
crises of HealthCare.gov and the canceled policies. At the confab, Senator 
Landrieu, and other vulnerable democrats who were up for re-election, 
dubbed the “2014ers,” criticized the President for nearly two hours in the 
Roosevelt Room. Reportedly, Biden was willing to serve as the scapegoat. 
“Just attack us,” he said.109 “Blame us.”110 Politico wrote that the vulnerable 
Senators were given a “green light to bash the White House and call for 
certain legislative fixes. But they’ve been urged by senior administration 
officials not to insist on delaying” the individual mandate.111 According to a 
readout from the meeting, Obama “emphasized that he shared the Senators’ 
commitment to ensuring that Americans who want to enroll in health 
insurance through the Marketplaces are able to do so in time for insurance 
coverage to start as early as January 1st.”112 But he stopped short of 
endorsing a delay. 
105 Rebecca Berg, Hillary Clinton in 2007: “If You Have a Plan You Like, You Keep It”, WASH.
EXAMINER (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://washex.am/22gb4pV. 
106 David Ono, Vote 08: Barack Obama Wins Illinois, ABC 7 (Feb. 5, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://
perma.cc/47ZU-HYZD.
107 Scott Gottlieb, The Clintonian Roots of Obamacare, 25 NAT’L AFF. 51, 62 (2015), https://
perma.cc/TZ5B-J7SH.
108 GOP War Room, Clinton: Before It Was Called “Obamacare,”It Was Called “Hillarycare”,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2j5WmLAYRs.
109 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Michael D. Shear, Inside the Race to Rescue a Health Care Site, and 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1MERH2E. 
110 Id.
111 Manu Raju & Seung Min Kim, Dems Give W.H. Tight ACA Deadline, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 
2013, 6:19 PM), https://perma.cc/ER2D-SKB3. 
112 Press Release, The White House, Readout of the President’s Meeting with Senators on the 
Affordable Care Act (Nov. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/EYZ8-4DTY. 
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As the pressure mounted, in the House of Representatives both 
Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader Pelosi agreed that Congress should 
take legislative action to deal with the canceled plans.113 “I’m highly 
skeptical they can do this administratively,”114 Boehner said, doubting that 
executive action could fix the situation.115 Pelosi said “I want to do both”—
a statute and administrative fix, for a “belt and suspenders” approach.116 On 
November 15, the House of Representatives passed the Keep Your Health 
Plan Act of 2013 on a bipartisan vote, 261–157.117 The one-page bill—
similar to Senator Landrieu’s proposal—would have allowed any plan that 
was valid in 2013 to be grandfathered into 2014.118
Thirty-nine Democrats crossed the aisle to vote aye. A senior adviser 
to Representative Pelosi said the defectors were trying to “insulate” 
themselves from the unpopular cancellations.119 The Washington Post 
observed that the “vote was a striking show of Democratic disunity and the 
largest Democratic defection on a major piece of legislation this 
year.”120 Fearing that the bill could pass the Senate—with the vulnerable 
2014ers already backing a similar proposal from Senator Landrieu—the 
President issued a veto threat to the House bill.121 President Obama claimed 
that it would “allow[] insurers to continue to sell” inadequate plans, and 
would “sabotage the health care law.”122 But it was not the veto threat that 
prevented the Senate from taking action on the bill—it was the President’s 
newly announced executive action. 
VII. OBAMACARE IS “NOT THE REASON WHY
INSURERS HAVE TO CANCEL YOUR PLAN”
On November 14—one hour before the House of Representatives 
voted on the Keep Your Health Plan Act—the President announced what 
would become known as the administrative fix.123 In a speech in the press 
113 Aaron Blake & Paul Kane, Boehner, Pelosi Say Legislative Fix Needed for Obamacare,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/9VZA-UHZP. 
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Keep Your Health Plan Act of 2013, H.R. 3350, 113th Cong. (2013); Final Vote Results for 
Roll Call 587, GOVTRACK (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/113-2013/h587.  
118 H.R. 3350, 113th Cong. (2013). 
119 Sean Sullivan, Pelosi Downplays Obamacare Defections; Clyburn Says Dems “Insulating” 
Themselves, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/CM4P-XMTW. 
120 Id.
121 Justin Sink, White House Threatens Veto of Upton Bill, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:21 PM), 
http://goo.gl/wbxTmb.
122 Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
goo.gl/NA0dz7.
123 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Affordable Care Act 
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room, Obama recognized the difficulties posed by the canceled policies. “I 
completely get how upsetting this can be for a lot of Americans,” he said, 
“particularly after assurances they heard from me that if they had a plan that 
they liked, they could keep it.”124 In response, the President “offer[ed] an 
idea that will help.”125 HHS would “extend” the ACA’s “grandfather 
clause” to “people whose plans have changed since the law took effect.”126
The decree permitted “insurers [to] extend current plans that would 
otherwise be canceled into 2014, and [allowed] Americans whose plans 
have been canceled [to] choose to re-enroll in the same kind of plan.”127 It 
would be up to state insurance commissioners and the individual insurance 
companies to decide whether to continue to sell policies that did not comply 
with the ACA’s mandate. However, neither would be required to embrace 
the fix. 
Ironically, this executive action mirrored the Keep Your Health Plan 
Act—the same bill that Obama threatened to veto earlier that day because it 
would “sabotage” the ACA. Now, Obama was unilaterally implementing 
virtually the same reform, without the benefit of congressional support. 
Even more ironically, The Wall Street Journal observed, “Mr. Obama is 
doing through executive fiat what Republicans shut down the government 
to get him to do.”128 One of the eleventh-hour attempts to avert a shutdown 
was a one-year delay of the individual mandate. President Obama refused to 
negotiate on this point—or any other for that matter—warning that such a 
delay would undermine the law. Yet, not even a month later, he did exactly 
that.
Shortly after the announcement, HHS memorialized the new policy in 
a letter, stating that non-compliant health plans “will not be considered to 
be out of compliance” in certain circumstances.129 In other words, the very 
plans that the law rendered invalid because they did not provide “minimum 
essential coverage” would now be re-grandfathered. The administrative fix 
waived the “minimum essential coverage” rule for millions; people who 
renewed old, thrifty plans were exempted from the mandate and penalty. 
(Nov. 14, 2013, 12:01 PM), https://perma.cc/2YYC-LP2U.
124 Id.; Politifact selected this assurance as 2013’s “Lie of the Year.” Angie D. Holan, Lie of the 
Year: “If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You Can Keep It”, POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2013, 4:44 PM), 
http://goo.gl/wVIOP4.
125 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Affordable Care Act 
(Nov. 14, 2013, 12:01 PM), https://perma.cc/2YYC-LP2U.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Obama Repeals ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://on.wsj.com/
1RHiX6h.
129 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to State Ins. Comm’rs, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2013), 
https://goo.gl/Ws05A4 [hereinafter Cohen Letter]. 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
07 - BLACKMAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
408 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:389 
After the President finished answering questions from the press, his 
Chief of Staff Denis McDonough met with the fifty-five members of the 
Democratic caucus.130 The Washington Post reported that White House 
officials “tried to calm the group and pleaded for time to try to repair the 
damage without any legislative interference, pledging to fix the federal Web 
site.”131 Afterwards, McDonough and his staff crossed the Hill to meet with 
200 House democrats. In total, the urgent meetings ran nearly four hours. 
Ezra Klein recognized that the executive action “makes it easier for the 
White House to stop congressional Democrats from signing onto something 
like Landrieu’s” bill.132
The announcement of the administrative fix took the insurance 
industry by total surprise, once again. They were not prepared for the 
sudden “about-face” in light of the President’s previous opposition to a 
delay.133 Even worse, President Obama could now blame the insurance 
companies, and not the law he implemented, for the cancellations. “[W]hat 
we want to do is to be able to say to these folks,” Obama said, “the 
Affordable Care Act is not going to be the reason why insurers have to 
cancel your plan.”134 As Sarah Kliff observed, the President “described this 
policy decision as one allowing the White House to shift the blame for 
cancellations from the White House to the health plans.”135 In other words, 
it will be the insurers’ fault if they don’t re-grandfather the plan canceled 
because of Obamacare. 
The insurance companies were “furious” at the fix.136 Karen Ignagni, 
president of America’s Health Insurance Plans, charged that the 
cancellations were a direct result of the ACA. “The only reason consumers 
are getting notices about their current coverage changing,” she said, “is 
because the ACA requires all policies to cover a broad range of benefits that 
go beyond what many people choose to purchase today.”137 The law was 
working exactly as his senior adviser Jeanne Lambrew and others in the 
Obama administration had designed. But now that people were being 
harmed by these decisions, the White House was improvising. 
130 Paul Kane & Jackie Kucinich, Health-Care Law’s Problems Test Loyalty of Democrats in 
Congress, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/7MXT-2DEM. 
131 Id.
132 Ezra Klein, Everything You Need to Know About the Plans to “Fix” Obamacare, WASH.
POST (Nov. 14, 2013), http://wapo.st/1S6a1JJ. 
133 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Michael D. Shear, Inside the Race to Rescue a Health Care Site, and 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1MERH2E. 
134 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Affordable Care Act 
(Nov. 14, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://1.usa.gov/25O3YNZ. 
135 Sarah Kliff, Insurers Are Furious About the White House’s New Obamacare Plan, WASH.
POST (Nov. 14, 2013), http://wapo.st/1op24Bq. 
136 Id.
137 Id.
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Ignagni feared that “changing the rules after health plans have already 
met the requirements of the law could destabilize the market and result in 
higher premiums for consumers.”138 She warned the administration that 
“additional steps must be taken to stabilize the marketplace and mitigate the 
adverse impact on consumers.”139 After the announcement, an emergency 
meeting was convened between the President and health care executives to 
address what The Washington Post referred to as the “level of anxiety 
within the insurance industry about the administration’s policy fix.”140
Robert Laszewski, an insurance industry consultant, wrote to his clients that 
day, “This puts the insurance companies who have successfully complied 
with the law, in a hell of a mess.”141
Also taken by surprise were the state insurance commissioners, who 
were now responsible for deciding whether to allow the noncompliant plans 
to be sold in their states.142 Washington state insurance commissioner Mike 
Kreidler—who was an ACA supporter—immediately came out in 
opposition to the fix: “We will not be allowing insurance companies to 
extend their policies,” he said.143 “I believe this is in the best interest of the 
health insurance market in Washington.”144 Kreidler explained that he 
found out about the fix while he was at the gym that morning. He was 
surprised that the President pursued executive action, rather than a 
legislative amendment. “What I didn’t expect or anticipate,” he said, “was 
the fact the president would make this announcement” without any advance 
warning.145
After the President’s announcement, Kreider recalled, an email was 
sent out with “big exclamation points” scheduling an “emergency meeting 
of insurance commissioners.”146 National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) president Jim Donelon told The Washington Post,
“It only dropped in our laps yesterday morning.”147 A statement from NAIC 
said the fix “threatens to undermine the new market, and may lead to higher 
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Sarah Kliff, How States Are Deciding Whether to Accept Obama’s Cancellation “Fix”,
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), http://wapo.st/1S6aFHc. 
141 Sarah Kliff, The White House’s Obamacare Fix Is About to Create a Big Mess, WASH. POST
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qxxqYR. 
142 Cohen Letter, supra note 130, at 1.
143 Sarah Kliff, The Backlash to the Obamacare Fix Has Already Started, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 
2013), http://wapo.st/1ShboPJ. 
144 Id.
145 Sarah Kliff, Wash. Insurance Regulator Supports Obamacare—and Rejected Obama’s 
“Fix.” Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qxyFqY. 
146 Id.
147 Sarah Kliff, Obama’s Meeting with Insurance Regulators Is Going to Be a Bit Awkward,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://wapo.st/1V0oqIi. 
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premiums and market disruptions in 2014 and beyond.”148 Kansas Insurance 
Commissioner Sandy Praeger, a rare ACA supporter in a red state, 
lamented, “It’s just a big mess right now.”149 She added, “I don’t know 
what to tell people.” 
William P. White, the District of Columbia’s insurance commissioner 
rejected the administrative fix.150 “The action today undercuts the purpose 
of the exchanges,” White said, “by creating exceptions that make it more 
difficult for them to operate.”151 The next day, D.C. Mayor Vincent Gray 
fired White, stating that he was not authorized to criticize the President’s 
announcement. Council member Vincent Orange, who oversaw the 
District’s insurance department, explained, “[Y]ou can’t have the 
commissioner out there taking on the president, and the mayor being on a 
different page.”152
The delay of the individual mandate did not go through what is known 
as notice-and-comment rulemaking. This process affords the public with a 
thirty-day opportunity to comment on a regulation before it is published—
and the agency is supposed to reply to objections. HHS explained that it had 
“good cause” to forego rulemaking, explaining that “[t]here have been 
unforeseen barriers to enrollment on the exchanges.”153 Michael Greve—
who helped launch the legal challenge in King v. Burwell154—quipped, 
“You don’t say. . . . [T]he ‘unforeseen barriers’ are principally a result of 
HHS’s own fantastic screw-up.”155
VIII. “OBAMACARE ITSELF IS THE HARDSHIP”
Even with the November administrative fix in place, many canceled 
plans would remain canceled. Half of the states rejected the administrative 
fix, and even in those states that embraced it, many insurers refused to 
reissue certain canceled plans. Those affected customers would now be 
forced to purchase new policies on the exchanges. There was a growing 
148 Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Insurance Commissioner Fired a Day After Questioning Obamacare 
Fix, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qwR0nH. 
149 Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Relying More on Insurance Carriers to Help 
Fix HealthCare.gov, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2013), http://wapo.st/1RT1V1M. 
150 Mike DeBonis, D.C. Insurance Chief Is Undecided on Obamacare Exemptions, WASH. POST
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://wapo.st/1V0p1K7. 
151 Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Insurance Commissioner Fired a Day After Questioning Obamacare 
Fix, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qwR0nH. 
152 Aaron C. Davis, Fired D.C. Insurance Commissioner Tried to Apologize for Criticizing 
Obamacare Fix, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2013), https://goo.gl/Ar7Nzb. 
153 Michael S. Greve, Obamacare’s Unforeseen Barriers, LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Dec.
16, 2013), https://perma.cc/R8Q6-5XE9. 
154    King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
155 Michael S. Greve, Obamacare’s Unforeseen Barriers, LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Dec.
16, 2013), https://perma.cc/R8Q6-5XE9. 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
07 - BLACKMAN_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
2016] Government by Blog Post 411 
concern that it would be unfair to penalize people whose policies were 
canceled by the ACA and who were required to buy more expensive 
insurance or could not sign up on HealthCare.gov. 
On December 19—with less than two weeks before the individual 
mandate would go into effect—a group of six vulnerable Senate Democrats 
wrote to Secretary Sebelius.156 They requested “explicit clarity” on whether 
those who had canceled plans but could not buy new policies would be 
exempted from the mandate and penalty.157 Senator Joe Manchin of West 
Virginia, one of the signatories of the letter, worried, “If it’s so much more 
expensive than what we anticipated, and if the coverage is not as good as 
what we’ve had, you’ve got a complete meltdown at that time.”158 The law, 
he said, “falls of its own weight, if basically the cost becomes more than we 
can absorb.”159
The very next day, Secretary Sebelius wrote back to the sextet, 
acknowledging that “too many [consumers] have found [that] their policies 
bec[a]me unaffordable.”160 In “half the states” that accepted the 
administrative fix, Sebelius wrote, the number of people with “canceled 
plans who do not have quality, affordable coverage for 2014 is clearly 
shrinking.”161 Nonetheless, she noted, “despite all these efforts, there still 
may be a small number of consumers who are not able to renew their 
existing plans and are having difficulty finding an acceptable replacement 
in the Marketplace.”162 Sebelius offered a “clarification” of the law.163
“Those with canceled plans who might be having difficulty paying” for a 
compliant plan should “qualify for [a] temporary hardship exemption,” 
thereby excusing them “from the individual responsibility requirement.”164
Yuval Levin, a conservative commentator, referred to the letter from the 
Senators as “bizarre kabuki theater.”165 He quipped, “If you think a 
regulatory change announced Thursday was made in response to a letter 
156 Obama Repeals ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://on.wsj.com/
1RHiX6h.
157 Letter from Mark R. Warner, U.S. Sen., et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & 
Hum. Servs. (Dec. 18, 2013), http://goo.gl/JZdbNE. 
158 Aaron Blake, Manchin: Obamacare Could Suffer “Complete Meltdown”, WASH. POST (Dec. 
22, 2013), http://wapo.st/1ULJtOy. 
       159  Susan Cornwell, Democratic Senator Says Obamacare Could Have “Meltdown,” Hurt Party,
REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2013), http://goo.gl/7USvNs.
160 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Mark R. Warner, 
U.S. Sen., at 1 (Dec. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/QY67-BW3H. 
161 Id. at 2.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Yuval Levin, Pounding on the Panic Button, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/
57K7-EHTU.
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sent Wednesday, I’ve got a bridge over the East River to sell you.”166
In a memorandum issued the same day, HHS explained that anyone 
whose policy “will not be renewed,” or whose new plan is “more expensive 
than” the canceled plan, “will be eligible for a hardship exemption.”167
These consumers were, in effect, excused from the individual mandate on a 
showing that their old policy was canceled or that a new policy was more 
expensive. This would be true in virtually every single case—this was 
especially true because there was no verification process in place to double-
check these claims. 
In her brief letter, Sebelius disrupted the intricate compromises the 
Obama administration reached years earlier to ensure that people would be 
required to purchase comprehensive plans. Stephen Brill observed that “the 
hard line on grandfathering that Lambrew and the other Obama people had 
taken had now completely backfired.”168 Further, the hardship exemption
was in no way based on financial need—a person only needed to show that 
their plan was canceled. Ezra Klein admitted that “this puts the 
administration on some very difficult-to-defend ground.”169 Those who had 
their policies canceled—regardless of their income—are exempted; but 
other uninsured people are still subject to the penalty. 
The legal basis for the hardship fix was sketched out by Professors 
Nicholas Bagley and Austin Frakt two months earlier, in an article aptly 
titled Saving Obamacare Without Congress.170 First, the Professors 
explained that the law allows for a “hardship exemption” for anyone who 
has “suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage 
under a qualified health plan.”171 Second, Secretary Sebelius can “grant a 
certification” for particular individuals attesting that “there is no affordable 
qualified health plan available through the Exchange.”172 As a result, if 
these two provisions are put together, the scholars explained, “it could be a 
“hardship” if there is “no affordable qualified health plan available through 
the Exchange.”173
166 Id.
167 Options Available for Consumers with Cancelled Policies, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 19, 
2013), https://perma.cc/ZCQ3-YG9H. 
168 BRILL, supra note 44. 
169 Ezra Klein, The Individual Mandate No Longer Applies to People Whose Plans Were 
Canceled, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2013), http://wapo.st/1MWSi5k. 
170 Nicholas Bagley & Austin Frakt, Saving Obamacare Without Congress, BLOOMBERGVIEW
(Oct. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/GYB8-N55G. 
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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But there is an ironic quality to this reasoning. Congress created 
several categories of people who would be exempted from the ACA’s 
mandate: “individuals who cannot afford coverage,” “taxpayers with 
incomes below filing threshold,” “member[s] of Indian tribes,” and anyone 
who “suffered a hardship with respect to the capability to obtain coverage 
under a qualified plan.”174 Congress set a strict threshold for exemptions 
from the penalty due to inability to pay: those for whom the annual cost of 
coverage exceeds eight percent of their household income.175 These are 
individuals with extremely low incomes. 
HHS’s blanket policy of exempting anyone whose insurance was 
“more expensive” than before, irrespective of annual income, is impossible 
to reconcile with the congressional scheme.176 This hardship “exemption” 
swallows the rule. Ezra Klein aptly summarized the change: “in other 
words, Obamacare itself is the hardship.”177 Law Professor Seth Chandler 
joked, “Surely, however, the existence of the ACA itself can not be the 
human-caused event creating the hardship.”178 Through this administrative-
law shell game, the executive swept away Congress’s exemption design. 
The Wall Street Journal editorialized, “A tornado destroys the 
neighborhood or ObamaCare blows up the individual insurance market, 
what’s the difference?”179
Once again the insurance industry was caught off guard by this 
distortion to the health care markets. Karen Ignani said, “This latest rule 
change could cause significant instability in the marketplace and lead to 
further confusion and disruption for consumers.”180 Analyst Avik Roy 
explained that the “Insurers are at their wits’ end, trying to make sense of 
what to do next.”181 Jonathan Gruber explained that this delay is “by itself 
not a huge problem,” however he added, “[m]ore widespread cracks in the 
mandate could start to cause enormous problems for insurers.”182 In March 
174 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)–(5) (2012). 
175 Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012).
176 Options Available for Consumers with Cancelled Policies, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS.
OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 19, 
2013), https://perma.cc/ZCQ3-YG9H. 
177 Ezra Klein, The Individual Mandate No Longer Applies to People Whose Plans Were 
Canceled, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2013), http://wapo.st/1MWSi5k. 
178 Seth Chandler, Obama Administration Shocking Decision to Drop Individual Mandate—But 
Only for Some, ACADEATHSPIRAL.ORG (Dec. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/A56Q-3F58. 
179 Obama Repeals ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://on.wsj.com/
1RHiX6h.
180 Jennifer Haberkorn & Carrie Budoff Brown, White House Broadens Obamacare Exemptions,
POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2013), http://politi.co/1oGUh2f. 
181 Avik Roy, Utter Chaos: White House Exempts Millions from Obamacare’s Insurance 
Mandate, “Unaffordable” Exchanges, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2013), http://onforb.es/1VC1QnS. 
182 Dylan Scott, Does New Obamacare Mandate Exemption Open a Pandora’s Box?, TALKING
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2014, the Obama administration extended the hardship exemption until 
2016—right in time for the presidential election.183 The individual 
mandate—the purported cornerstone of the law, without which it could not 
function—was modified, delayed, and suspended in 2014 and 2015. 
IX. “CLARIFY AN ISSUE”
One of the more obscure, but glaring, executive actions concerning the 
Affordable Care Act altered the health insurance markets in the U.S. 
territories. Insurers in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American 
Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands were required to guarantee 
policies to all customers—regardless of any preexisting conditions—and 
could not charge them higher premiums.184 These provisions are known as 
guaranteed issue and community rating. However, residents in the 
territories were not subject to the individual mandate, and consumers could 
wait until they got sick to purchase policies.185 As the D.C. Circuit observed 
in its Halbig decision, the mandates for guaranteed issue and community 
rating, when decoupled from an individual mandate, would throw the 
“insurance markets in the territories into turmoil.”186 This is the proverbial 
death spiral that the authors of the Affordable Care Act purportedly sought 
to avoid—but with respect to the territories, mandated. Ezra Klein referred 
to the situation in the territories as the “oddest health reform disaster you’ve 
never heard of.”187
Recognizing this severe risk, the territories requested to “be excluded” 
from the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions to avoid this 
disarray.188 On three separate occasions, however, HHS explained to the 
territories that Congress crafted the provisions to “apply . . . in the 
territories,” and they could not be waived administratively.189 In 
unequivocal terms, the letter concluded that “HHS has no legal authority to 
exclude the territories from the guaranteed availability provision of the 
Affordable Care Act.”190 The agency told the territories, “However 
POINTS MEMO (Dec. 20, 2013), http://bit.ly/1oGV82P. 
183 Jason Millman, Will States Go Along with the Latest Obamacare Fix?, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 
2014), http://wapo.st/1qxIq8v. 
184 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook: The First Crack in the Individual Mandate, WASH.
POST (Dec. 20, 2013), http://wapo.st/1qxIOE5. 
188 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Sixto K. Igisomar, Sec’y of Com. of N. Mar. I., 
at 2 (July 12, 2013), http://goo.gl/27VpRH. 
189 Id. at 1.
190 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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meritorious your request might be, HHS is not authorized to choose which 
provisions . . . might apply.”191 The administration explained that their only 
remedy was to “seek legislative relief from Congress, which could enact 
legislation to create an exemption from the guaranteed availability 
provision or other changes as Congress deems appropriate.”192
What a difference a year makes. On July 16, 2014, CMS Administrator 
Marilyn Tavenner wrote to the Lieutenant Governor of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands to “clarify an issue” of the “application of certain Affordable Care 
Act provisions to health insurance issuers in the territories.”193 Note, once 
again, the use of the term clarify. In the intervening year, however, HHS 
learned that “this interpretation is undermining the stability of the 
territories’ health insurance markets.”194 As a result, once again, executive 
action was warranted. After a “careful review of this situation and the 
relevant statutory language,” Tavenner continued, HHS determined that the 
guaranteed-issue and minimum-essential-coverage provisions “do not apply
to the territories.”195 Insurers could now discriminate against patients with 
pre-existing conditions and deny them coverage. 
It is impossible to reconcile the government’s turnabout. After the 
territories asked for clarification three times, and Congress did nothing to 
change the statute, the answer should have remained the same: no.
However, because the law yielded unpopular consequences, the President 
took his own steps to disregard the plain text of the statute, and in the 
process destabilize the market. This is the exact problem a year earlier the 
government said it had “no legal authority” to resolve.196
X. CONCLUSION
The President’s opposition to legislative changes to the ACA is not 
unreasonable. As Nicholas Bagley noted,
To some extent, the President’s willingness to press against legal 
boundaries is an understandable and even predictable response to the 
difficulties of implementing a complex statute in a toxic and highly 
polarized political environment. Congress’s unwillingness to work 
constructively with the White House to tweak the ACA has increased 
the pressure on the administration to move assertively to manage the 
191 Id. (emphasis added).
192 Id.
193 Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dept. of Health 
& Hum. Servs., to Gregory R. Francis, Comm’r, Off. of the Lieutenant Gov., Div. of Banking & Ins., at 
1 (July 16, 2014), http://goo.gl/MYljpg. 
194 Id.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Cohen Letter, supra note 130, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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challenges that inevitably arise in rolling out a massive—and critically 
important—federal program.197
There is no doubt that such a vote would be loaded with amendments to 
change other provisions of the law. After all House Republicans have voted 
fifty-plus times to repeal the law—a quixotic effort because the President 
would veto any repeal. (Though, many House Republicans were sent to 
Congress in 2010 and 2012 on a wave of popular opposition to the ACA, 
with an electoral mandate, however unrealistic, to try to repeal the law.) 
But that’s part of the ballgame. When Congress passes an unpopular 
law, on a straight party line vote,198 that isn’t working well, it can and 
should be changed. If Congress votes to take actions that the administration 
thinks will “sabotage” the law, the veto pen remains. The view that the 
ACA, as enacted in 2010 must remain unchanged—subject only to the 
unilateral changes made on a whim—strains credulity. The ad hoc, random 
manner in which the ACA has been amended, many of the revisions made 
for clear political advantages, should not be afforded the same presumption 
of constitutionality as other laws, duly enacted by Congress, and faithfully 
executed by the Chief Executive. 
197 Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, NEW ENG. J. MED.
(May 22, 2014), www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1402641 (emphasis added). 
198 Josh Blackman & Randy E. Barnett, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO OBAMACARE 3–84 (“The ACA’s party-line vote was unprecedented for such a major law. Not a 
single Republican in the House or Senate supported this law. Forty-nine percent of the House of 
Representatives opposed it, hardly a mandate (no pun intended) for transformational change. . . . All of 
the landmark social welfare and civil rights laws enacted in the twentieth century were passed with 
bipartisan support, often through messy political compromises and bargaining. The Social Security Act 
of 1935 was supported by 77 Republicans in the House, who joined 288 Democrats. In the Senate, 15 
Republicans joined 60 Democrats. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the Senate by a vote of 73 in 
favor and 27 opposed. A bold coalition of 27 Republicans and 44 Democrats united to break a 
segregationist-led filibuster. The Social Security Amendments of 1965, which created Medicaid and 
Medicare, passed the House by a vote of 307–116, with 70 Republicans voting in favor. This 
monumental health care legislation cleared the Senate by a vote of 70–24; 13 Republicans crossed the 
aisle. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 was passed with broad bipartisan support as was the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act passed with 90 percent agreement in the 
House and Senate. The absence of any consensus for the ACA in 2009 was remarkable and proved an 
inauspicious start.”). 
